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Abstract 
Issues of Taxation in the Oil and Gas Sector in Selected 
Countries: Lessons for Ghana undertakes a review of 
petroleum taxation in selected countries around the 
world and seeks to fashion a way for Ghana’s infantile 
petroleum industry. In other words, the study seeks to 
facilitate a smooth tax regime and policy for Ghana. The 
study is based on literature arising from desk research as 
well as through telephone interviews. Petroleum taxation 
regimes of the countries under study portend to mitigate 
the current inconsistencies and resulting contentions from 
tax payers in Ghana. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This study takes a brief overview of general taxation 
practices, specifically on oil and gas taxation from around 
the globe, and draws some lessons on the tax issues for 
Ghana’s young oil and gas sector. Taxation here includes 
income taxes and royalties paid by oil and gas producing 
companies to local authorities and national governments 
on whose lands and seas oil and gas are drilled. In order 
to ensure both regional and global representation, oil and 
gas taxation issues were gleaned from Nigeria in West 
Africa, United States, Canada, Indonesia, Ukraine, The 
United Arab Emirates, and Venezuela. The effects of 
petroleum taxation issues from these age-old “big shots” 
in the oil sector could assist to discuss key tax legislations 
impacting upstream petroleum operations and compliance 
obligations of petroleum taxpayers in Ghana as well as 
assist to discuss petroleum tax risk management issues 
under the various laws of Ghana and chart an appropriate 
way forward for her infantile oil and gas sector. 
Taxation has been defined variously to mean any 
system that compulsorily ensures the surrender of control 
of an entity’s private goods and or services to enable a 
government in the provision of public goods and services. 
Tax is a form of compulsory contributions or payments 
from households and firms or organizations to support 
government expenditure (Aheto, 2012). Hence, oil and gas 
tax is the tax petroleum companies pay to governments 
according to explicit statutes and regulations (Wright & 
Gallun, 2008). Oil and gas taxation is therefore an essential 
attribute of national power, making its improvement a key 
feature of nation-building. This concern, which emphasizes 
the idea of tax restructuring as an investment fundamental 
to extensive national development, has been outstanding 
in recent policy initiatives. This should especially be so 
considering the gargantuan amounts that are invested and 
derived from the oil and gas sector of an economy. What is 
ambiguous is what its increased recognition entails for tax 
advice and policy (IMF, 2011). 
Mintz (2010) explains that company tax for oil and gas 
concerns is imposed on the incomes made from the sale 
of oil and gas net of the production costs which comprise 
current mining costs, capital cost allowances, as well as 
exploration and development costs. Exploration costs are 
expensed while development costs are capitalized and 
written off at the declining balance rate. 
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While oil and gas taxation includes royalties, according 
to Mintz (2010), for oil and gas taxation, it is essential to 
account for royalties in an exceptional way. In oil and gas 
taxation, royalties are payments made to a landowner by a 
company extracting minerals, oil, or gas from the owner’s 
land (Microsoft Encarta, 2008). 
1.  METHODOLOGY 
Time and again, income tax laws, and for that matter 
oil and gas tax laws, vary significantly from country to 
country (Wright & Gallun, 2008; Ley & Boccardo, 2010). 
Consequently, oil and gas taxation issues that arise in 
a particular country have differed from those of other 
countries though some may appear similar. The literature 
which reviews some of the petroleum taxation issues in 
various countries testifies to the variability of taxation 
laws and issues in different countries and, in this study, 
Ghana, as well. 
The methodology adopted in this enterprise was 
basically desk research. Vast amounts of the data were 
obtained by reviewing literature relevant to the cause. 
Information on Ghana’s existing legislation on oil and gas 
were also reviewed. In addition, a telephone interview 
was employed to elicit valuable information from a tax 
expert to complement the literature. 
The countries selected include the United States of 
America, Canada, Indonesia Republic, Ukraine, United 
Arab Emirates, Venezuela, and Nigeria. These countries 
were selected to ensure that there is a blend of oil-
producing countries from different geographical regions. 
Moreover, the selection was to ensure the inclusion of 
longstanding and big as well as young oil sectors for the 
best possible depiction of the issues in question. It must 
be emphasized that the aim was not to do an extensive 
study of all the petroleum taxation issues in the selected 
countries but to glean from them to help in the formulation 
of uncomplicated oil and gas tax policy for Ghana. 
2.  ISSUES OF PETROLEUM TAXATION 
IN SELECTED COUNTRIES 
2.1  Petroleum Taxation Issues in the United 
States of America 
The U.S. income statutes stipulate a computation for use 
in determining depreciation deductions on equipment used 
in U.S. domestic petroleum operations and a dissimilar 
computation for calculating depreciation on petroleum 
equipment used in locations outside the U.S. (Wright & 
Gallun, 2008). This implies that a U.S. petroleum company 
that does both domestic and international operations 
ought to adhere to three tax laws; namely, the foreign 
country’s income tax laws, U.S. income tax laws on 
domestic operations, and U.S. income tax laws governing 
international operations. These, arguably, are bound to 
raise a lot of taxation issues for the company in question. 
Another oil and gas taxation issue worth mentioning is 
that, a petroleum company drilling oil in the United States 
is liable for determining its taxable income in accordance 
with United States tax laws and paying any appropriate 
taxes to the government of United States. In the same 
direction, a United States petroleum company drilling oil 
in Ghana can conform to both the tax laws of Ghana as 
well as those of United States, the home country. These 
requirements should be recognized by applying the 
statutes of both the home country and the international 
location. There may be tax credits in the home country 
as well as tax treaties between the two countries to 
circumvent double taxation on the same profits. These 
statutory requirements are further made complex when a 
petroleum company operates locally and internationally. 
However, this practice requirement is not an isolated case; 
it virtually applies to all oil companies and oil producing 
countries in most countries of the world. 
2.2  Petroleum Taxation Issues in Canada 
In Canada, the lands are owned by the provinces, so the 
royalties are rental payments for the benefits received 
from drawing out the petroleum from the provincial 
lands. Thus, provincial royalty payments are a tax or 
cost to hydrocarbon companies for using public property. 
However, since the government of an oil-rich province 
is responsible for the royalty administration and could 
exercise taxes like the corporate income tax to earn 
revenue, there is the tendency to regard royalties as 
an element of the general fiscal administration to raise 
revenue. Technically, the oil and gas businesses’ rental 
benefit received should be deducted from taxes and 
royalty payments to measure the general fiscal impact. 
This is impractical to do without assessing some precise 
rental charge for use of provincial property (Mintz, 2010). 
Moreover, unlike payments based on the economic 
rents earned on oil and gas projects, royalty payments 
may misrepresent economic decisions. Alternatively, 
to ensure comparability across jurisdictions, one may 
compute the comprehensive tax and royalty effective 
tax rates; for instance, between Alberta and Texas. It is 
worthy to point out that royalties in the exploration and 
development stage are “negative” on condition that such 
expenses are deductible from the royalty base, which, in 
some situations, will be the case. Every province with oil 
and gas production makes provision for the deductibility 
of reserve royalties from income. Cases in point are that 
Ontario is the sole province that continues to make use of 
the resource allowance that relates to mining, capital taxes 
are being phased off in Saskatchewan and Nova Scotia, 
and sales taxes on capital acquisitions are considered for 
British Columbia and Saskatchewan alongside retail sales 
taxes (Mintz, 2010). 
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2.3  Petroleum Taxation Issues in Indonesia 
Republic 
The Indonesian government was taking into account 
scraping import duties for equipment that are used in 
developing oil and gas blocks mutually operated by the 
government and international partners because under a 
current cost-recovery scheme for non-domestic investors, 
the equipment were owned by the government in the 
long run. Moreover, the government was to free oil and 
gas companies exploring in Indonesia from the value-
added tax (Input Solutions, 2004). Obviously, increasing 
foreign investment in the oil and gas sector is critical 
to Indonesia’s efforts to boost its dwindling economy, 
and embarking on tax reforms and policies favorable to 
investors appeared to be the nation’s bait. 
2.4  Petroleum Taxation Issues in Ukraine 
One source puts it that the tax regulatory structure 
of Ukraine can be portrayed as quite convoluted and 
containing a considerable amount of ambiguous and 
contradictory provisions. It further states that, regrettably, 
there is no Tax Review Panel in the country or any other 
professional body to appreciate and analyze every one of 
the practical issues connected with a particular tax law. 
Consequently, tax legislation gets frequently rewritten 
which completely creates fresh problems instead of being 
just modified and improved (Alt Kiev, n.d.). 
Ukrainian tax rules, like those of Ghana, are not 
presented in a single unvarying code but instead are 
assembled in no less than a dozen of separate legislation 
acts .  Those laws then f ind their  supplementary 
explanations and practical handlings in hundreds of 
Resolutions, Decrees, Orders and Letters. Listed below 
are the major sources of tax legislation in Ukraine: 
Law on Value Added Tax (VAT); 
Law on Corporate Tax; 
Law on Tax Liabilities Settlements of Taxpayers to the 
Budgets and Special Funds; 
Law on Personal Income Tax (PIT); 
Law on System of Taxation; 
Decree of the President on Eased Tax, Accounting and 
Reporting Regime for Small Business (Alt Kiev, n.d.). 
The multiplicity of sources of oil and gas tax 
legislation creates conflicting statutes which make 
computation and compliance difficult for tax preparers 
and companies as well as the government. 
2.5  Petroleum Taxation Issues in the United Arab 
Emirates 
The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is an aged and a huge 
petroleum producer in a foremost producing region, 
the Arabian Gulf. As early as 1967, Abu Dhabi joined 
the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC) and the Federation took over this membership 
in 1974. The Federation has also since 1970 been a 
member of the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OAPEC). The UAE has extensive oil and 
gas reserves, and enjoys a secure production capacity. 
Petroleum is the keystone of the Federation’s economy. In 
1958, oil was first found in Abu Dhabi. In 1962, extraction 
started from the offshore regions, followed by onshore 
fields in 1963. The petroleum sector was developed at 
an incredible speed. In 1963, the Emirate of Abu Dhabi 
commenced exporting crude and before long became a 
foremost worldwide oil exporter (Suleiman, n.d.). 
With the most plentiful oil reserves (more than 90% 
of the Federation’s petroleum reserves), Abu Dhabi is the 
leading oil producer out of the seven Emirates making 
up the Federation. Whereas Dubai, Sharjah and Ràs Al 
Khaymah have estimated 4.0 billion barrels, 1.5 billion, 
and 0.1 billion respectively, Abu Dhabi’s oil is estimated 
at 92.26 billion barrels (Suleiman, n.d.; Webb, 2010). 
The UAE has neither a fused federal petroleum 
legislation nor a federal petroleum policy under which 
the provisions governing grants for exploration and 
development certificates are fixed beforehand. In keeping 
with the UAE Constitution, some matters are left to the 
control of the individual member Emirates, such as oil and 
gas matters. Each of the petroleum producing Emirates 
has a Petroleum Department, the chief of which is Abu 
Dhabi (Suleiman, n.d.). 
This source continues to report that, since 1988, 
the Supreme Petroleum Council of the Emirate of Abu 
Dhabi has replaced the Petroleum Department in Abu 
Dhabi. It grants exploration permits as well as petroleum 
concessions, concludes different oil agreements, defines 
the oil and gas policy of each Emirate, and exercises 
the other functions of public authority in the petroleum 
sector. Since Abu Dhabi is the biggest oil producing 
Emirate and most profitable, with the largest petroleum 
reserves and has the best ever history of relationships 
with multinational oil companies, it is suitable to focus on 
its legal taxation framework for oil and gas resources as 
representative of the Federation in this respect. 
In 1966, the Government of Abu Dhabi and the two 
concessionaires, Abu Dhabi Petroleum Company (ADPC) 
and Abu Dhabi Marine Areas (ADMA), concurred to 
substitute the flat three rupees per ton royalty by a 12.5% 
royalty. Additionally, the two companies agreed to comply 
with the Income Tax Law of 1965 and to pay an income tax 
at the rate of 50%, which was raised to 55% in 1971. This 
improvement in financial conditions was maintained until, 
in 1974, the OPEC formula was effected (Webb, 2010). 
Completed on May 3, 1981, The Deminex Agreement 
is representative of the most recent model of concession 
agreement Abu Dhabi has adopted. Article 3 of it, 
entitled Ownership of Natural Gas, instructs that “all 
natural gas that may be discovered or produced in 
the concession area in association with crude oil or 
independently shall be subject to the provisions of 
Law No. 4/1976”. Law No. 4/1976 established the sole 
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ownership of Abu Dhabi Emirate over all its associated 
as well as non-associated gas. 
Article 10 provides for bonus payments: an initial 
$2 million bonus, another $2 million subsequent to 
commercial discovery, $5 million following when regular 
crude oil exports reach an average of 100,000 barrels 
a day, and finally $10 million after regular exports of 
200,000 barrels a day is achieved (Suleiman, n.d.). 
Subsequently, Article 13 talks about royalty payments 
and espouses a progressive or sliding scale royalty 
concept: each year the oil company shall pay to the 
Government a royalty (fully expensed) equal to 12.5% 
of the produced crude oil posted price. But the company 
shall pay a royalty of 16% if the production during the 
calendar year reaches an average rate of 100,000 barrels a 
day. Moreover, if the production gets to an average rate of 
200,000 barrels a day, the royalty will go up to 20%. 
Also, Article 17 concentrates on taxation which adopts 
a sliding scale of income tax: it provides that the oil 
producing company shall pay a 55% basic income tax. 
But, the income tax shall be paid at 65% if the crude oil 
production during a calendar year reaches an average of 
100,000 barrels a day. Should the production reach an 
average of 200,000 barrels a day, the company shall pay 
an income tax at the rate of 85%. 
For income tax assessment and subsequent payment, 
the oil producing company shall be subject to the 
requirements of the Abu Dhabi Income Tax Decree 1965, 
as amended, complemented by the provisions of Article 17 
of the (Petroleum) Agreement. In addition, the Agreement 
in Article 18 states that no other or higher taxes, duties, 
charges or fees shall be imposed upon the company after 
it has determined the taxation to which the concessionaire 
is subject. Besides, at any time after the discovery of oil in 
commercial quantities by a company, Article 44 provides 
that Government, in all rights and obligations under this 
Agreement, has option to acquire a participating interest 
of up to sixty percent (60%) (Suleiman, n.d.). 
In spite of all these very stringent provisions on 
taxation, hydrocarbons still provide for nearly 80 percent 
of total government revenues of the United Arab Emirates 
(UAE). Unfortunately, in 2008-2009, the country was 
stricken hard by falling petroleum prices (Heritage, 2012; 
Suleiman, n.d.), underscoring the danger of over-reliance 
on petroleum revenues and taxes. 
2.6  Petroleum Taxation Issues in Venezuela 
According to Eluniversal (2011), in 2008, Venezuela’s 
crude oil production was the tenth-highest in the entire 
world at 2,394,020 barrels per day (380,619 m3/d) and was 
also the eighth-largest net oil exporter. As of 2010, the 
country had become the fifth-largest petroleum exporting 
country in the world with the largest reserves of heavy 
crude oil then estimated at 99.4 billion barrels (1.580×1010 
m3). Venezuela, a founding member of the Organization 
of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), had the 
largest reserves of both light and heavy crude oil in the 
whole of the western hemisphere. By 2010, Venezuelan 
production had in fact declined to around 2.25 Mbbl/d 
(358,000 m3/d). Today, with the second-largest reserves 
of heavy crude oil after Canada, Venezuela has become 
the fifth largest oil exporting country in the world. With 
significant amounts of capital investment by her national 
oil company, Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA), Venezuela 
could potentially boost oil production capacity by 2.4 
Mbbl/d (380,000 m3/d) from 2001 level of 3.2 MMbpd to 
5.6 MMbpd by 2025. 
Also, Taxrates (2010) reveals that Venezuelan 
regulations require 50% corporate tax rate for oil 
companies and income from petroleum-related activities. 
Thirty-four percent tax is required from companies 
engaged in oil exploration, exploitation, refining, 
processing, transport, distribution, marketing, storage as 
well as export of non-associated natural gas. Moreover, 
the companies are furthermore charged a tax or royalty 
at 30% on the amount of crude oil produced. Of course, 
for heavy-oil projects or marginal fields, in special 
circumstances, the country’s Ministry of Energy and Oil 
may decrease the royalty rate to 20%, and it is at liberty to 
re-establish the 30% royalty. 
To ensure effect ive compliance,  mining and 
hydrocarbon companies in Venezuela should file estimated 
returns within the first 45 days of each year, and must pay 
at that time advance payments of 96% of the tax resulting 
from the estimate. Within 3 months of the close of the 
company’s financial year, final income tax returns should 
be filed and payment of tax liability made at that time. 
Late filing of returns attracts penalties from 10% to 200% 
of the amount due, plus flat fines. The annual interest 
rate on outstanding payments is equal to the maximum 
commercial bank rate plus 20% (Taxrates, 2010). In 2011, 
Venezuela declared the intention to increase a windfall tax 
on oil companies in consideration of rising oil prices. The 
Venezuelan government was to take the measure in order 
to adapt to the oil prices reality on a worldwide scale, 
which will keep on increasing (Boothroyd, 2011). 
Recently, as per decree No. 8, 163, published in the 
Extraordinary Gazette No. 6,022 containing the law that 
creates a special tax on windfall and exorbitant oil prices 
in international oil markets, the Venezuelan government 
has established an extra 20 percent tax on petroleum 
windfall revenues obtained by state-owned oil company, 
Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA), and its joint ventures 
any time petroleum prices oscillate between USD 40 and 
USD 70 per barrel. The Official Gazette reads: 
When the monthly average of the Venezuelan basket of 
liquid hydrocarbons in international markets is above the 
price set in the Law on Budget of the corresponding fiscal 
year, but not higher than USD 70 per barrel, a 20 percent 
tax will be levied on the difference between both prices. 
The Venezuelan decree also stated that petroleum 
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export revenues attained from non-domestic “and 
financing agreements, which would amount to 800,000 
barrels per day including oil cooperation agreement, 
Petrocaribe, bilateral agreements and shipments to China, 
will be also exempted from the tax”. This is in pursuance 
of the President’s agenda to free his Venezuela from the 
United States of America (Eluniversal, 2011; ETCN, 
2011). On the whole, it is obvious that Venezuelan 
policies very much hinder the potential increase of private 
investment in the country’s oil sector. 
2.7  Petroleum Taxation Issues in Nigeria 
Nigeria is a primary oil producer on the continent 
of Africa with the largest gas reserves. The Energy 
Information Service estimated that the country had an 
average crude oil production level of 1.94 million barrels 
per day in 2008; she produced a total of 2.17 million 
barrels of oil per day and exported 1.9 million of the 
daily production (Legall, n.d.). As the main hub of the 
economy, the oil industry provides between 90% and 
95% of Nigeria’s export income, over 90% of her foreign 
exchange revenues, and approximately 80% of government 
revenue (Nwete, n.d.). 
The law that presently governs upstream activities 
in Nigeria, enacted in 1959 (NAPIMS, 2012), is the 
Petroleum Profit Tax Act (PPTA) 2007 (Jewell, n.d.; 
Osolake, 2010; Olajide & Associates, n.d.). Pursuant 
to the PPTA, Nigeria’s Federal Inland Revenue Service 
(FIRS) taxes petroleum operations (Legall, n.d.) at the 
rate of 85% (Nigeria-law, 2012). Nonetheless, it is 65.5% 
for companies which have not completely amortised 
their capitalised preproduction expenditure (Nwete, 
n.d.). These apart, all companies registered in Nigeria are 
required to pay Education Tax at 2% of chargeable profits 
as contribution to the Education Tax Fund (Education Tax 
Act No. 7 of 1993) (Nigeria-law, 2012). 
Section 2 of the PPTA defines petroleum operations 
(upstream) that are taxable as follows: (a) Exploration, 
(b) Appraisal, (c) Drilling/Mining, (d) Extraction, (e) 
Transportation by pipelines, (f) Sale of chargeable oil, 
and (g) All other operations incidental to any of the above 
(Osolake, 2010). Downstream operations which include 
marketing and refining activities are not subject to the 
PPTA (Jewell, n.d.) but under the Companies Income Tax 
Act (CITA) (Osolake, 2010). 
Nigeria’s existing legislations that were affected by the 
new PPTA include: 
The Petroleum Profit Tax Act 1959; 
The Petroleum Act 1969; 
The Petroleum Technology Development Act 1973; 
The Associated Gas Re-injection Act 1979; 
The Petroleum Equalisation Fund Act 1989; 
The Oil Pipelines Act 1990; 
The Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation Act 1997; 
The Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency 
Act 2003 (Legall, n.d.). 
At its bill stage, Legall (n.d.) quoted Tolu Aderemi, a 
solicitor at Perchstone & Graeys, Lagos, as saying that 
the PPTA would provide a “more robust, accountable and 
transparent oil and gas industry” and that it would serve 
to “consolidate a plethora of laws, statutes and regulations 
which regulate the Nigerian oil and gas industry” as well 
as “reform, review and streamline existing legislation, in 
order to deliver a fair, economic return for Nigeria as well 
as for investors.” Again, one Dr. Mgbeoji is purported to 
have fully agreed that Nigeria’s new oil and gas legislation 
would include copious ideas for improving the sector, but 
he contended that “the bottom line is whether these ideas 
will be implemented with courage and honesty”. 
For a very successful implementation of Nigeria’s 
new legislation on oil and gas and to maintain existing 
companies and attract new ones, all provisions on 
institutional reform, environmental concerns, and on 
reduction of institutional burdens should be implemented 
to the letter. However, a second look must be taken at the 
too many regulatory bodies with overlapping functions 
which, unavoidably, fosters clumsy bureaucracy, creates 
misunderstanding and impedes approval processes, in 
most cases. 
Okwe (2012) reported that Nigeria’s half-year (January 
to June, 2012) oil tax revenue collection by her Federal 
Inland Revenue Service was two-thirds of a total of N2.43 
trillion; that is, N1.60 trillion. Collections of non-oil taxes 
for the same period amounted to N838.58 billion, most 
likely the first time the nation has achieved this since oil 
find. 
In another development, Salau (2012) lamented that the 
implementation of the country’s $10 billion (N1.5 trillion) 
gas monetisation scheme master plan is in danger of 
failing because it appears the NNPC had not spoken to any 
of the oil firms who have a major role of investing in the 
revolution agenda as well as delivering the gas needed for 
the projects incorporated in the programme. Specifically, 
the firms were conspicuously excluded from the critical 
planning stage of the important exercise, creating doubts 
in the minds of the firms of the viability of the project. 
The project which is to expedite the nation’s industrial 
rebirth by constructing two world-standard petrochemical 
plants, two plants for fertilizer production as well as 
five fertilizer blending plants, one methanol plant, and 
one distribution plant for liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) 
is also to fully commercialise and salvage Nigeria’s 
Power Holding Company whose debt is estimated to be 
increasing at about N1.5 billion every month. In fact, 
this scheme is expected to have a gargantuan impact on 
the Nigerian economy; it is projected that, between 2012 
and 2014, the fertilizer and petrochemical projects would 
attract more than $10 billion (N1.5 trillion) foreign direct 
investment (FDI). 
As decried by Austin Avuru, Managing Director of 
Seplat Petroleum Company Limited, one of the operators 
Issues of Taxation in the Oil and Gas Sector in 
Selected Countries: Lessons for Ghana 
172Copyright © Canadian Research & Development Center of Sciences and Cultures
in Nigeria, both the multinational and indigenous oil and 
gas companies are not happy about the current pricing 
mechanism, the deplorable state of infrastructure, and 
discouraging regulatory framework. Moreover, the 
companies allege that where the oil and gas will come 
from, the practicality and the components of the project 
have not yet been communicated by the NNPC which 
appears not to be serious about the project though the 
project is to take off in 2012. Again, although Mr. Avuru 
lauded the objectives of the scheme, he disapproved of the 
implementation and methodology. He is further quoted as 
saying that (Salau, 2012) the current gas pricing would 
not encourage returns on investment while the tax is 
increasing. What we have in the new PIB is the royalty 
(...down to two percent) but tax has gone up to 80 percent 
although they might claim there was some rebate which 
is just 60 cent/thousand, for the first one tcf that you 
produced. What it means is that at $2 gas price, effectively 
the tax rate has gone up from 30 percent to 65 percent, 
even after giving you the rebate. 
Obviously, the unprecedented drop in percentage 
of petroleum tax collections as against non-oil taxes in 
the first half of 2012 should send the signal that Nigeria 
should not virtually depend on its petroleum revenue 
forever. Unless there is evidence that the other sectors 
of the nation’s economy are bucking up, this is not a 
healthy signal. The country should do well to streamline 
all contentious taxation issues to encourage and attract 
the much needed local and foreign investments and also 
invest in other potential sectors of the economy. The 
nation cannot afford to “wholly” rely on the petroleum 
sector and at the same time scare investment in the sector 
through outlandish and outrageous taxation statutes and 
sidelining of major stakeholders, as it is being speculated. 
2.8  Issues on Petroleum Taxation in Ghana 
Ghana recently struck oil in commercial quantities at 
its Jubilee Fields, offshore the country, with an initial 
estimated value of US $3.1 billion (Main, 2009). More 
of such oil-finds have since followed beside the Jubilee 
project in subsequent years. Long before and especially 
after the oil find in Ghana, different sets of laws have been 
passed to govern the administration of petroleum taxes. 
The different canons have given rise to contradictions 
which inadvertently have created several critical concerns 
that need to be addressed for a much better tax regime 
and policy. Ghana’s petroleum industry is at its infant 
stage and almost all her petroleum tax issues centre on 
legislation. Consequently, there is need to study the 
provisions in the nation’s petroleum tax laws to facilitate 
in synchronising the legislations to mitigate the confusion 
and contentions between tax agencies and tax payers. 
The oil and gas taxation provisions of Ghana are 
similar to those of Ukraine and Nigeria; they are 
convoluted and contain a considerable amount of 
ambiguity and contradictions. The statutes governing 
petroleum taxation in Ghana are not presented in a single 
unvarying code but instead are assembled in several 
legislative acts. The laws then find their supplementary 
explanations and practical handlings in hundreds of other 
forms of resolutions or enactments. 
Specific areas under Ghana’s oil and gas taxation 
are the legal framework for taxation and revenue types, 
ascertainment of chargeable incomes under Petroleum 
Income Tax Law (PITL) – deductions, and withholding 
tax – sub-contractors and employees. Other areas are 
Internal Revenue Act (IRA) relating to upstream oil and 
gas operations (there are serious areas of inconsistencies 
between PITL & IRA), and the Petroleum Agreements. 
The rest are the Internal Revenue (Amendment No. 4) 
Bill, Value Added Tax as well as Customs, Excise and 
Preventive Service provisions (Ali-Nakyea, 2012). 
Arising from the Nigerian experience, the local people 
of Ghana on whose lands and sea the oil has been found in 
commercial quantities are very much aware that the direct 
impact of oil and gas companies’ activities primarily fall 
on them while the benefits accruing from such activities 
in the form of taxes and royalties are considered national. 
The local communities therefore vie for a right from 
government to suitably negotiate with both government 
and the oil and gas companies for bearing the brunt of the 
negative externalities that shall arise from the operations 
of the companies. 
In setting rates for oil and gas taxation, it is important 
to differentiate between companies which have not 
completely amortised their capitalised preproduction 
expenditure and those who have. For Ghana, with a 
young oil industry which aims to attract the best oil and 
gas companies, these rates should not be initially high 
like those of countries with well-established oil sectors 
like Nigeria (85% and 65%) or the UAE and Venezuela 
where there are sliding scale income tax systems and high 
royalty payments. Proper inquiries should be made as to 
which tax system or a blend of which would better suit 
Ghana considering its peculiar circumstances. 
An attempt to have an accountable and transparent 
oil and gas industry that would serve to consolidate a 
plethora of laws, statutes and regulations to regulate the 
Ghana oil and gas industry should be to reform, review 
and streamline the existing legislation, so as to deliver a 
fair, economic return for Ghana as well as for investors. 
In an attempt to formulate new legislation on petroleum 
and improve on existing ones with the aim to maintain 
existing companies and attract new ones, all provisions 
on institutional reform, environmental concerns, and on 
reduction of institutional burdens should be carefully 
implemented. There should be the political will to 
avoid or eliminate too many regulatory bodies with 
overlapping functions which, unavoidably, will foster 
clumsy bureaucracy, create misunderstanding and impede 
approval processes. 
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Oil-rich countries have depended too much on 
petroleum taxes, usually up to as much as 80% and above 
in government revenues, and this has not always augured 
well for such countries. An example is the unprecedented 
percentage drop in Nigeria’s petroleum tax collections 
as against non-oil taxes in the first half of 2012. Another 
instance is UAE’s experience in 2008-2009 when the 
country was stricken hard by falling petroleum prices, 
badly affecting its economy. These should send signals to 
Ghana which should not virtually depend on its petroleum 
revenue, ignoring massive investments in other sectors 
such as agriculture, manufacturing and processing which 
have been sustaining the nation over the years. Venezuela 
can be emulated for using her oil and gas tax revenues to 
revamp several of her other sectors of the economy. 
Periodically, Ghana should review and study the 
prevailing tax and custom policy to unearth more sound 
petroleum policies which will enhance more investment 
in the coming years. The government should consider the 
potential benefits of scraping import duties for equipment 
that are used in developing oil and gas blocks mutually 
operated by the government and international partners 
as well as a cost-recovery scheme for non-domestic 
investors so that the equipment will be eventually owned 
by the government. 
An incentive can be the freeing of oil and gas 
companies exploring in Ghana from the value-added 
tax (VAT) since embarking on tax reforms and policies 
favorable to investors are nations’ bait. Such attractions 
could carefully be intermingled with statutory provisions 
such as allowing government, at any time after the 
discovery of oil in commercial quantities by a company, in 
all rights and obligations under the Petroleum Agreement, 
the option to acquire a participating interest of up to say 
fifty-one percent (51%) or more. 
CONCLUSION 
The lessons from the experiences of neighbouring Nigeria 
and other oil-rich countries should serve as an eye-opener 
to Ghana in formulating its petroleum tax regimes and 
policies. The quest for the most apposite and trouble-free 
legislation has led to conflicting assemblage of tax laws 
in different legislative instruments. Still other legislations 
existed decades before the actual oil and gas find that need 
repeals to be in harmony with the contemporary laws to 
ensure smooth compliance. 
Ghana should do well to streamline all contentious 
taxation issues to encourage and attract the much needed local 
and foreign investments and also invest in other potential 
sectors of the economy. What is needed is not rewriting of 
tax legislation which completely creates fresh challenges. 
The nation should not scare investment in the sector through 
outlandish and outrageous taxation statutes and sideline major 
stakeholders; rather, it should create incentives. 
Finally, it is suggested that past petroleum bills should 
be synchronised to eliminate all discrepancies that create 
contentions for tax payers. A panel for Petroleum Tax 
Review established to appreciate and analyze every 
one of the practical issues connected with a particular 
tax law should be in order. The Institute of Chartered 
Accountants, Ghana (ICAG) could be drafted into the 
preparation of petroleum tax bills and their subsequent 
discussion by Parliament to ensure that technical issues 
are treated appropriately. 
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